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ABSTRACT 
 
The American University in Cairo, Egypt 
Name: Esraa Aziz Mokhtar Muhammad Makled 
Supervisors: Prof. Hassanein H. Amer and Dr. Ramez M. Daoud 
Wireless Networked Control Systems (WNCS) have recently emerged as a 
replacement for wired control networks. Wireless networked control systems are more 
suitable for environments that require higher flexibility and robustness.  
In previous literature a wireless manufacturing line was proposed. The work-cells 
communication was through IEEE 802.11 technologies and a switched Ethernet 
backbone. This thesis is aiming to improve the current solution by adding a supervisor 
to the existing system. The supervisor could be either in passive or active mode. 
Passive supervisor would intervene when all controllers in the network fail, while 
active supervisor would act once any controller on the line fail. 
The system was simulated using OPNET software with 95% confidence analysis. 
The ability of the system to withstand external interference was assessed through 
adding a single band jammer to the OPNET simulation. The system was able to hold 
up to 8KB interfering file sent from a single band jammer affecting the full Wi-Fi 
spectrum. All results were subjected to a 95% confidence analysis 
The performability of passive and active supervisor systems was compared. A 
Markov model of both systems was built. It was shown that by time, the 
performability of a passive supervisor system is enhanced while that of an active 
supervisor system degraded. However, the active supervisor showed a better 
performability in all cases. 
 
 
. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Networked control systems research is one of the pillars of the industrial 
development. Since the introduction of digital systems to the field of control systems, 
the need for communication between field nodes and controllers emerged. Thus, it 
was essential to provide a networking environment that supports the communication 
of the field nodes with controllers.  
The networking environment used is similar to conventional networks at the 
physical level, however has different requirements in implementation. In Networked 
Control Systems (NCSs), field devices like sensors send small packets at a certain 
frequency to the controller. The controller processes the data and takes a decision. 
Then, the decision is forwarded to the actuators, which implements the action on the 
field [1-3].  
One of the main differences between conventional networks and networked control 
systems is the need for accurate timing, error free communication and deeper 
hierarchy [4-7]. These requirements in addition to the need of being highly 
deterministic elected CAN (Controller Area Network) and PROFIBUS technologies, 
at first, to prevail the market of NCS [8-10]. 
By time, technological advancement of communication protocols unfolded. Also, a 
level of flexibility was allowed in NCS. These factors encouraged the incorporation of  
non-deterministic protocols like Ethernet, PROFlNET, EtherNetlIP, Time- Triggered 
Ethernet (IT Ethernet) and Flexible IT Ethernet to position themselves as players in 
the NCS market [10-15]. 
Currently, there is a trend to resolute to wireless solutions. Similar to the case with 
the Ethernet earlier, moving to wireless has become a trend because it is more 
efficient in terms of cost and time [8]. Moreover, it provides freedom, robustness and 
ability to work in hazardous environment. In addition, wireless solutions reduce the 
probability of cable damage [8]. Hence, allows for freer equipment motion. These 
factors made the introduction of Wireless Networked Control Systems (WNCSs) a 
normal evolution to the networked control systems in industrial automation [8].  
WNCSs decreases operational cost and simplifies installation. Main technologies 
used for WNCS are Bluetooth, Zigbee and WLAN [8]. A commercially available 
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solution is WISA (Wireless Interface of sensors and Actuators) by ABB (ASEA 
Brown Boveri) [16,17]. WISA uses modified Bluetooth for communication of nodes.  
Another WNCS system was introduced in research in [18]. The system in [18] uses 
standard 802.11 technologies and switched Ethernet for communication between its 
nodes [19, 20]. The system has 30 sensors and 30 actuators connected through Wi-Fi 
to two access points. The access points are connected to a controller through switched 
Ethernet [18-20]. The system was able to fulfill the needed requirements for NCS 
including error-free timed communication.  
The model in [18] was improved gradually. Concatenation of two cells was 
introduced in [21]. The concatenation of three cells was made possible in [22,23]. The 
system was able to withstand interference without affecting its performance in the 
case of the failure of two out of three controllers. 
As mentioned in [8], the deep hierarchy is one of the main characteristics of 
industrial networks. Deep hierarchy differentiates industrial networks from 
commercial networks. The term deep hierarchy indicates that the control network 
would have a lot of layers, like field devices, control devices, human interface, 
supervisor layer or database. Each layer could be served using different protocol. 
In this study, hierarchical networks would be introduced to the system in [22] by 
adding a supervisor to the three concatenated cells to monitor the performance of the 
three controllers. The supervisor would follow the previous approach in [24-26] to be 
either active or passive supervisor. Active supervisor would takeover any controller 
function in case of a controller failure. Meanwhile, in passive supervisor mode the 
supervisor would intervene only if all three controllers failed. The system would be 
tested in the presence of interference. Performability study will be done to assess the 
performance of the systems in both modes. 
Section II starts with a literature survey of networked Control Systems in general. 
This would be followed by debrief of WNCS for Industrial Automation existing 
solutions with focus on the system in [18].  Overview of hierarchical networks in 
NCS would be presented afterwards followed by a problem statement. 
Section III studies the effect of adding a deeper hierarchical level to the system in 
[21].  The research extends the system by adding a supervisor above the three 
controllers. The study includes testing the possible configurations of fault-tolerance 
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and recovery in the presence of supervisor. Additionally, the research includes testing 
the robustness of the system against interference. 
Section IV focuses on assessing the performance of the active and passive modes 
using performability modeling. Section V would conclude the thesis.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
II.1. NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS (NCS) 
Networked control systems share certain aspects that differentiate them from 
typical communication networks [8].  These differences are: application, application 
domain, hierarchy, failure severity, reliability, round trip time, determinism, data 
composition, temporal consistency and operational environment. [8].  Networked 
control systems are expected to be facilitating the communication of physical 
equipment, like sensors and robotic arms, in a plant [8].   
NCS has a deep hierarchical structure. A hierarchical example for NCS is a control 
network composed of field devices, controllers and supervisors. Each level is separate 
and may have an independent communication protocol from other levels on the 
system [8]. 
 The consequences of failures in NCS are high. A failure in an NCS can damage a 
full manufacturing line, which can be extremely costly [8]. In addition, expected 
environment for NCS is harsher than the environment for communication networks in 
general due to the industrial environment needs [8]. This is mainly because in general 
NCS networks are expected to operate in environments that are often experiencing 
adverse conditions such as moisture, dust, heat and vibration [8]. Hence, NCS needs 
to be robust and highly reliable.   
NCS devices send small, frequent packets at consistent strict deadlines [8]. The 
primary measure to choose the RTT value is that it should be less than the sampling 
period of the end devices [8].  
A NCS system can be time-triggered or event triggered depending on the presence 
of a clock signal on the system [2]. If the system has a common clock, it would be 
time triggered. Otherwise, the system would be event driven. 
Sensors in a time-triggered system have constant sampling period. Hence, samples 
are taken at discrete time points [2]. On the other hand, in an event-triggered system, 
the sampling is continuous and the control process is triggered by a certain event. The 
time taken by a packet to travel from sensor (S) to controller (K) and K to actuator 
(A) (propagation/transmission delays) may or may not include processing time, 
encapsulation, decapsulation and queuing delays, depending on the system design [2]. 
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Industrial applications are categorized into real-time and non-real-time 
applications. Real-time applications would require small, frequently exchanged 
packets [1-3].  Real-time networks are divided between soft and hard real-time 
systems [27-29]. Soft real time networks tolerate some packet losses and delays like 
video and voice conferencing applications. Hard real times systems are less likely to 
tolerate losses and high delays [27-29]. 
Deciding on whether a system needs a real time or non real time application 
depends on the type of data being transmitted on the industrial network[8]. The data 
types over a control network could be categorized into control, diagnostic or safety 
information [8].    
Control information is sent between instruments and the controllers and act either 
as an input or output of controller [8].  This requires real time communication with 
deterministic characteristics [8]. Example of control information would include 
actuator position and fluid flow [8].  
Diagnostic information is information collected but the controller is not required to 
act upon [8].  The information is used to monitor the plant and its health [8].   This 
type of information has much lower real time requirement [8].   
The most strict hard real-time of all types is the safety information as the controller 
needs to take immediate action based on the information it receives [8].  The type of 
information of concern in this research is control information.  
A basic NCS network would consist of sensors, controllers and actuators as shown 
in Figure 1. The sensors send sample data from the manufacturing plant to the 
controller. The controller processes the data and forwards the action needed to the 
actuator. The actuator would apply the decision on the physical process.  
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Figure 1: Basic NCS example [2] 
 
Earlier, CAN and PROFIBUS dominated the field of NCS [9,10]. These protocols 
provided the needed determinism and high predictability for the performance of 
industrial network (6,8). The demand for higher bandwidth and accessibility, led non-
deterministic protocols like Ethernet to be adopted in NCS [3,4,6-8,12,30,31].  
One of the barriers that delayed the adoption of Ethernet technology for NCS real-
time application is the utilization of Carrier Sense Multiple access with Collision 
detection  (CSMA/CD) [32]. The technique deploys the concept of binary exponential 
backoff (BEB). In BEB, when the transmitting node detects a collision it back off for 
a certain duration of time. The value of time varies between 0 and 2k – 1 time-slots, 
where k is the number of collisions detected/avoided. Examples of modified Ethernet 
are EtherNet/IP, Time-Triggered Ethernet (TT Ethernet) and Flexible TT Ethernet 
(FTT Ethernet) [33-38]. Recently, unmodified Ethernet for use in real-time 
applications has been standardized [14,15]. 
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II.2. WIRELESS NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS 
For the past decade, a trend emerged within industrial networking to implement 
fieldbus protocols using wireless technologies [38]. There are many motives to adopt 
wireless technologies in NCS. Wireless technologies are cheaper to install and 
maintain. The reduction in the wiring required for communication decrease 
installation cost. Moreover, applying wireless technologies on machines that involve a 
lot of motion, eliminate the cost and hazard of wear and tear of wires. In addition, 
Wireless technologies on NCS grant accessibility to areas where cables could be 
impractical, restricted or to hazardous environments [16-18]. Wireless technologies 
are also faster and simpler to commission and reconfigure. 
 In spite of the benefits brought by wireless solutions, there are some obstacles 
facing the development of a wireless networked control system. Some of the main 
problems are that they cannot resist heavy interference and they are non-deterministic 
due to non-static routes [8, 39].  
When deciding upon incorporating wireless technologies to industrial networks, 
there were two options; either reusing existing standard for conventional networks or 
starting from scratch [8]. Reusing the existing wireless standards was preferred to 
creating standards from scratch dedicated to WNCS. Utilizing the available physical 
and data-link layers would reduce time and cost experienced  [8].  
Technologies using the unlicensed band were the most popular in the industrial 
field. These included Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), Bluetooth and Zigbee 
standards known as IEEE 802.11, 802.15.1 and 802.15.4 respectively [20,40,41]. 
Currently, available commercially is the Wireless Interface for Sensors and Actuators 
(WISA) by ABB [16,17]. Another WNCS solution is proposed in literature is WNCS 
system based on Wi-Fi [18,21-26]. 
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II.2.1. WIRELESS INTERFACE FOR SENSORS AND ACTUATORS 
(WISA) 
II.2.1.1. WISA SYSTEM 
Several studies in the literature discussed wireless networked control systems 
[16,17, 42-48]. A commercially available solution of WNCS is WISA by ABB [16, 
17]. WISA provides a powering module and a communication module .The system 
uses customized non-standardized Bluetooth for its wireless communication module 
[16,17,40]. The communication module connects sensors, actuators and controllers. 
The backbone is connected through a fieldbus. A typical WISA workcell is shown in 
Figure 2 [16]. A workcell contains around 120 nodes in an area of 3×3m. Table 1[16] 
shows some of the system attributes. The main set back of the WISA system is the use 
of non-standardized protocols [49]. 
 
Table 1: WISA parameters [16] 
Maximum number of nodes to one base station/Cell ID 120 
Maximum latency from WISA air interface 20ms 
Minimum distance to non-interfering WLAN/Bluetooth 25/16 m 
Maximum number of WLANS within interfering distance 1 
Maximum output RF power 1 mw 
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Figure 2: WISA WORKCELL [16] 
 
II.2.1.1. NOISE /INTERFERENCE IMMUNITY 
One of the main drawbacks of WNCS is being more susceptible interference than 
wired networks [16,17,46]. Some examples of those expected factors of noise on a 
factory floor are heat, welding and/or mechanical vibration [16, 17, 46]. A 
comprehensive experiment was done in [16] showing that factory floor noise 
including but not limited to arc welding, heat and vibrations would saturate around 
1.8 GHz [16,17,46].  Therefore, WISA operating in the 2.4 GHz band would be 
immune to noises from the factory floor. The only interference expected to affect 
WISA systems would be noise from equipment operating on the 2.4 GHz band.  
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II.2.2. WLAN WNCS PREVIOUS WORK 
II.2.2.1. SINGLE CELL MODEL [18] 
Another model for WNCS used WLAN for wireless communication between its 
nodes [18]. The backbone of the system proposed uses switched Ethernet as the 
communication protocol [18]. Using off-the-shelf equipment made it an appealing 
concept due to the simplicity of integration, cost-efficiency and compatibility. The 
system uses strictly Switched Ethernet and IEEE 802.11b. The system used the 
performance metrics and benchmarks of WISA system to measure its performance. 
The model is built within a square workcell. The side of the square is 3m length [18]. 
The workcell consists of 30 sensors, 30 actuators and two Wi-Fi access points namely  
(AP1 and AP2). The wireless load of the system is divided equally among the two 
access points. Both access points need to communicate on non-interfering channels 
(channels 1, 6 or 11). The model for single cell is shown in Figure 3.The system uses 
1mW to transmit data at the rate of the 11 Mbps. The system payload is chosen to be a 
10B User Datagram Packet (UDP) with a sampling period of 40ms. UDP is used 
because it does not require acknowledgement. Hence, UDP is more suitable for real 
time communication. The system provided good results with an ability to have 
moving sensors and actuators pairs and withstanding interference [50, 18].  
 
Figure 3: Single workcell with 802.11b 
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II.2.2.2. CELL CONCATENATION 
A. 802.11b System 
A production line consists of more than one workcell. This motivated the research 
of the possibility to concatenate several Wi-Fi WNCS workcells together [21]. All 
cells should be operating using same Wi-Fi WNCS proposed in section II.2.2.1. The 
workcells should operate within the allowable performance metrics and benchmarks.  
The single cell model in II.2.2.1 required two access points (APs). In order to 
avoid intersystem interference, each AP utilized one of the three non-interfering 
channels (1,6 or 11) [21]. Adding a new cell necessitates the use of four channels. 
Given there are only three non-interfering channels in 802.11b, one channel would 
need to be reused.  The need to reuse ones of the channels created co-channel 
interference. This required a minimum distance between the 2 cells of 2m, and PRPT 
of -50. The model presented in [21] added 1m of guard distance to have a total of 3m 
inter-cell distances. The non-reused channels were subjected to interference while 
reused channels where locked from being used by any external nodes.  The model 
simulated by the study on OPNET is shown in Figure 4. The system was able to 
satisfy the benchmarks required with a 95% confidence analysis. 
 
B.  802.11g  
In [22], 802.11g replaced 802.11b in section II.2.2.1. Due to the higher data rate of 
802.11g, a single access point was able to support all SAs within a workcell. There 
are several benefits due to this change. This change reduced delays and allowed for 
concatenation of up to 3 cells with 0 inter-cell distance. The increased data rate also 
allowed for fault-tolerance to be incorporated at the controller level (explained in 
sectionII.2.4.1). Figure 5 shows the single cell model. The model, with all of its 
variations, was simulated on OPNET and proved to be resilient to interference and to 
satisfy the needed benchmarks. 
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Figure 4: Two concatenated workcell on 802.11b [21] 
 
Figure 5: Single cell model using 802.11g [22] 
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II.2.3. HIERARCHICAL INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS  
One of the main features of Industrial networks is a deep hierarchy [8]. The 
hierarchy would include device level (including SAs), control level and information 
level [42]. Figure 6 shows an example of Hierarchical Industrial Networks. Device 
level is the lowest level on the hierarchy includes devices like robotic arms, sensors, 
valves, relays…etc [42].  Control level is where most of the control decisions of the 
systems are being taken [42].  Control level could be divided into two types of 
control, cell sublevel and area sublevel [42].  Cell sublevel is where the controller has 
its basic control function towards one cell [42]. Area sublevel would include 
supervisors over multiple controllers [42].  Information level is where servers and 
information about the system are being kept [42].  
 
Figure 6: Hierarchical Industrial Networks [42] 
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II.2.4. FAULT TOLERANCE  
One attractive research topic is fault-tolerance. In normal systems, if one 
component fails, the services operated by that component will be totally lost, which 
might lead to system failure. In a fault-tolerant system, the system can fully operate in 
case of failure of one or more component. The performance may be degraded, but the 
operation would not fail [51-57]. Downtimes are often costly. Fault tolerance systems 
are appealing because they reduce downtime.   
Applying fault-tolerance to a system happens at a cost too. In order to quantify the 
increased reliability of the system, reliability-modeling techniques are used. 
Reliability models are mathematical models that involve accurate data concerning 
potential failure rates. Another metric is increase performability of the system in 
different forms: steady state and cumulative performability [58-59]. Performability 
relates the expected failure rates and rewards of different states on the system [58-59]. 
II.2.4.1. FAULT TOLERANCE IN WI-FI WNCS ON THE CONTROLLER 
LEVEL 
The studies in section II.2.2.2 allowed for the concatenation of two or more cells, 
thus two or more controllers on the same production line. The presence of more than 
one controller encouraged the study of fault tolerance on the controller level.  
Controllers are on the second hierarchical level after the field equipment (sensors 
and actuators). Controllers on production lines are intelligent and powerful and can be 
assigned different tasks [60]. The application of fault-tolerance on the controller level 
was applied in [61, 22].  
 If any of the controllers failed, one of the neighboring controllers would takeover 
the control functions. In order to be able to achieve this all controllers are connected 
through 1GbE connection. Also, watchdog packets are exchanged between all 
controllers. Watchdog packets are sent at half the control-sampling period to insure 
that all packets arrive safely even in case of failure. In addition, data from all sensors 
is sent to all controllers on the manufacturing line. So, in case of failure of one 
controller, another can immediately replace and take corrective actions. 
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 Systems were simulated in fault-free and in situation where controllers went faulty 
and were able to continue operation within the designated benchmarks of 40ms end-
to-end delay and zero packets drops (95% confidence analysis). 
II.2.4.2. FAULT TOLERANCE ON THE SUPERVISOR LEVEL IN NCS 
Supervisor level could also be used to provide for fault-tolerance of controllers 
level. Supervisors can provide protection against failures of the controllers in two 
modes: Passive mode and Active mode. A supervisor operating in the passive mode 
(Passive supervisor) would intervene with the control process if and only if all the 
controllers under its area fail. However, if the supervisor is in the active mode (active 
supervisor) once any controller fails, the supervisor would intervene and claim the 
control load of the faulty controller/s. This was previously applied in industrial NCS 
network in [26] and on NCS networks on trains in [24, 25].  
One example of hierarchical fault tolerance in NCS is [24,25]. The research 
studied the performance of a single GbE two-wagon train control network. The 
network has two types of loads: control and entertainment. A wagon has two servers. 
One server is designated to entertainment, while the other carries the control load. 
Both wagons are interconnected to a supervisor. The supervisor was studied to be 
passive in [24] and active in [25]. The network operated properly even after the 
failure of all Controllers and Entertainment Servers; the Supervisor was able to 
successfully carry the control load of both wagons. It was shown that the packet end-
to end delays met the control requirements and that no packet was lost. The study 
showed that the architecture with active supervisor kept entertainment available for 
the passengers in more of the system states when compared to the architecture of 
passive supervisor. Simulations for the systems were done on OPNET simulation 
software. 
In [26], also the passive and active supervisor models were studied.  Active 
supervisor takes part in the control scheme and has a role in inter-machine 
synchronization. Accordingly, supervisor failure drives the whole system to stop 
operation. Passive supervisor collects information and does not intervene in control 
scheme unless necessarily. When the last controller fails, the supervisor takes control 
of machines. The scenario was done on two machines and three machines systems. In 
both cases it was shown that best back-up scenario for failed controller is again to be 
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replaced by the supervisor, not by one of its neighboring controllers. This would 
conclude that previous literature have recommended active supervisor over passive 
supervisor in terms of the performance. 
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II.3. MULTICASTING 
Another study that targeted improving the system in section II.2.1 introduced 
multicasting [61]. Multicasting allows the system to have fault tolerance capability 
without the need to duplicate the sensors data on the wireless medium. Figure 7.shows 
the difference between applying multicasting vs. applying unicasting. K1 and K2 are 
two controllers without multicasting; fault tolerance would include adding more 
overheads on the wireless network. Each sensor had to replicate its data streams 
(green and blue arrows) so it would send one data stream per controller. So, the 
wireless network load was duplicated. The controller will not need to replicate its data 
to the actuator in all cases (blue arrow). 
Introducing Multicasting, the sensors would send only one single stream to the 
access point, regardless of the number of controllers involved in the fault tolerance 
process. The access point would act as a rendezvous point. A rendezvous point 
duplicates data as needed and sends it to the targeted controllers. Therefore, traffic on 
the air link will remain the same in all cases. This would improve the system 
performance and increase the ability of the system to tolerate interference over the air 
link. 
  
(A)Unicasting 
Figure 7: Multicasting vs. Unicasting 
 
 
(B)Multicasting 
 
 
__ K1 to actuator 
- - Sensor data copy 1  
- - Sensor data copy 2  
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II.4. INTERFERENCE STUDY 
As mentioned in section II.2.1.1, on a factory floor environment the only 
interference that could harm the system would be due to another communication on 
the 2.4 GHz band. In [17] it was shown that all factory floor environment actions like 
arc welding and mechanical vibrations would settle at around the 1.8 GHz, hence 
could not affect a system operating in the ISM band. 
The research in [62] studied in depth all types on interference that could affect the 
system in section II.2.2.1. The study used OPNET [63] to simulate interference over 
the system. 
The paper divided interference into 3 types:  
a) Network Congestion 
b) Medium Congestion  
c) Jammers 
Network congestions happen when alien nodes communicate with the workcells. 
These could be maintenance engineer for example. The paper in [62] had two alien 
nodes placed around the cell as shown in Figure 8. One was placed on the left and the 
other on the right. Both nodes would communicate to the controller using an FTP 
application. The increased congestion above the Wi-Fi would lead to an increase of 
interference over the cell. The results show an exponential increase in delay with the 
increase in FTP file sizes, due to the congestion of the network. For this model, the 
maximum allowable FT file size that the system can withstand was found to be 
33Kbytes  
The second form of interference studied was medium congestion. In medium 
congestion another independent Wi-Fi networks would operate in the vicinity of the 
work cell over the same Wi-Fi channels. The model presented in this study has two 
alien Wi-Fi nodes communicating together (instead of with the controller in the 
network congestion). The communication is done using one of the channels utilized 
by the Work cell. Both channels would give nearly identical results as they do not 
interfere with each other. The largest size of file tolerated by the system is 28 Kbytes, 
which is less than that in the case of network congestion by 15%. 
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Figure 8: Interference Nodes Location as Shown on OPNET simulation [62] 
Jammers are nodes that interfere with the communication intentionally. In factory 
environment, jammers would represent an ambient interference. In order to simulate a 
Jammer, the study chose the single band jammer. The single band jammer would 
continuously target a fixed frequency band by sending one packet every interval of 
time. In order to maximize jammer interference, [61] targeted the channels used by 
the Workcell to be attacked by the jammer.  
The single band jammer had two variables to be investigated, the size of packet 
and the interval of sending the packet. First experiment included changing the inter-
arrival period between two consecutive packets and keeping the packet size constant 
at 2Kbytes and 5Kbytes. It was found that decreasing the inter-arrival period causes 
an increase in end-to-end delay. At very low inter-arrival times,  the delay exceeded 
the time constraint of 36ms and control packets  were dropped. The reason behind this 
is the increase in the rate of congesting the medium by continuously retransmitting 
over short time periods. It was observed that the minimum inter- arrival period that 
does not lead to exceeding the time constraint is 46ms at 2Kbytes packet. The 
minimum acceptable inter-arrival time increased to 200ms at 5Kbytes packet size. 
The next experiment was fixing the inter-arrival time to 500ms, and changing the 
file size. The maximum packet size that can be tolerated by the network in case of a 
single band jammer is at most 8Kbytes. This concluded that jammers are the most 
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severe type of noise that network could be subjected to. The jammer is idealized in 
order to be able to quantify for the damage and to compare it with other systems in 
future. 
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III. PROPOSED MODEL 
Research in this thesis is aiming to incorporate hierarchical architecture to the 
system described in Section II.2.2.2.B. The system has three workcells. Each of the 
workcells has its own controller. A supervisor would be added over the three cells. 
The supervisor would deepen the hierarchy of the system, hence expected to improve 
the performance as shown in previous work described in section II.2.3. The supervisor 
would have two modes either active or passive as described in literature review 
section II.2.3. Active supervisor would takeover once any controller fails. Passive 
supervisor would takeover only if all controllers fail. The resilience of the model to 
interference is tested using a single band jammer as suggested by literature review in 
chapter II.4. The model reliability would be assessed using Markov models and 
performability measures. 
III.1. TOPOLOGY 
The proposed model topology is shown in Figure 9. A conveyer belt topology is 
modeled in this research. The conveyer belt connects three work-cells. Each cell has 
30 wireless sensors and 30 wireless actuators. One controller manages all the devices 
within a work-cell. A supervisor monitors all three controllers on the conveyer belt. 
The wireless communication in each cell follows the IEEE 802.11g protocol. A 
work-cell would have an AP that supports the interface between wireless and wired 
communication on the system. The AP is connected to the controller (K) via an 
Ethernet switch, and provides the Wi-Fi communication medium for the wireless 
modules. The three switches on the conveyer belt are connected together. All switches 
are also connected to one final switch. The final switch is connected to the supervisor. 
All switched Ethernet connections are done using standard 1 GbE fiber optics cables. 
The supervisor is added to the system in order to increase its lifetime and reliability. 
Hence, the supervisor is expected to be the most costly, robust and reliable node on 
the system. Therefore, The switches are expected to fail last. 
Each work cell operates in an area of 3m×3m [18]. The switches, controllers and 
supervisor are not within the operation field of the system hence are allowed to be off 
the 3m×3m area. For the purpose of the study it will be assumed that the switches, 
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controller and supervisor are out of the operation area. This would be expected to 
slightly increase the system latency, but is a more likely to happen in real life model. 
 
Figure 9: Proposed Model [65] 
 
Sensors would start their action in the field by gathering data and forwarding it to 
the controller through the AP. The data is sent in the form of stream of packets, of 
size 10 bytes each. Therefore, if all packets arrived it is insured that the operation was 
done successfully. Sensors send packet at a sampling period of 40ms. 
Applying fault tolerance directly to the system would need large data to be 
transmitted over the air link. The data would be quadrupled, at some scenarios, by 
every sensor. The large amount of data would cause high traffic and delay over the air 
link. In order to facilitate the transport of data, and improve the performance of the 
system multicasting was used. 
In multicasting, each sensor would send only one stream of packets to a 
rendezvous point. IP multicasting groups are defined to the rendezvous point. The 
rendezvous point duplicates the sensor data and send the data as needed to the 
multicasting groups. Destinations and the number of copies are determined by the 
supervisor mode.  
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The system should abide by some benchmarks in order to be considered a 
successful WNCS system. The delay on the system should not exceed 36ms end-to-
end delay between sensors and actuators in any condition or status of the system. 
There should be no dropped packets or errors.  The choice of 36 ms gives a safety 
margin of 10% from the sampling period of the sensors. Hence, there would be no 
way the sensor sends a new packet before the earlier packet has reached the actuator. 
To simplify further explanation the following terminology would be used across 
the research: 
1. Controller of upper cell: K1 
2. Controller of middle cell: K2 
3. Controller of bottom cell: K3 
4. Supervisor: S 
III.2. PASSIVE SUPERVISOR 
As mentioned earlier, the supervisor has two main modes either passive or active. In 
the passive mode, the supervisor would only intervene when all controllers fail. 
Therefore, when one controller fails, another controller would takeover and not the 
supervisor. The supervisor would support for the control functions of all controllers if 
and only if all controllers failed. 
For the controllers on the same level to hold the function of each other in case of 
failure, they all need to be aware of the status of each other and all the data concerned. 
Also, on the occasion that all controllers fail at the time, the supervisor should be 
aware of the full profile of the three controllers, including data and decisions, at all 
times in case it needs to carry over the control functions. Such an arrangement would 
facilitate a smooth takeover of control. Hence watchdog packets are exchanged 
between controllers and each other and between controllers and the supervisor. 
Another watchdog packets exchanged on a much longer interval between sensors/ 
actuators and the controllers. These watchdog packets notify the sensors and actuators 
that a certain controller failed and hence they would stop addressing it. 
For the seamless transmission, all the sensor data on the system needs to be 
communicated to all functioning controllers at any instance. Also, the data needs to be 
forwarded to the supervisor. Figure 10 shows the data flow of the fault-free scenario. 
As shown, the sensor would send one data stream to the AP. The AP would quadruple 
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the data it receives from all sensors. Then the AP forwards a copy of data stream to 
each controller and a copy to the supervisor. The controller would process the data of 
the cells it is managing.  The controller would then forward the data it processed to 
the designated actuators. If one controller fails, another controller will do the 
processing and forwarding of the data of the failed controller. In case all three 
controllers fail, the supervisor would process the data for all cells and forward the 
decisions to the responsible actuators. Figure 11 shows the case when K1 fails and K3 
took over its control functions. The AP no more needs to quadruple its data it only 
triples it. And instead of K1 replying to the actuator, K3 replies. 
In order to support for such a configuration, all devices in the control plane 
(controllers and supervisors), need to be aware of each other status at all times. This 
would necessitate the exchange of watchdog packets between the control devices as 
shown in Figure 12.Watchdog packets should be sent at half of the sampling period to 
insure no data loss at any point in time. The watchdog packets are modeled as FTP 
packets of the size of 64 bytes, at 20ms difference from each other.  
 
 
Figure 10: Sensor Actuator Data Flow for Fault-Free Passive Supervisor 
 
- - - Sensor to AP 
- - - Sensor to K2 
- - -Sensor to K3 
- - -Sensor to S 
- - -K3 to A 
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Figure 11: Sensor Actuator data flow for K1 fail K3 TO passive super visor 
 
 
Figure 12: Watchdog flow for Passive Supervisor Fault-Free 
 
- - - Sensor to AP 
- - - Sensor to K2 
- - -Sensor to K3 
- - - Sensor to S 
- - -K3 to Actuator 
 
 
Watchdog between: 
__S and Ks 
__K1 and K2 
__K2 and K3 
__K3 and K1 
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Table 2: Possible states of passive supervisor 
Working Failed Taking over  
K1,K2,K3,S _ _ 
K2,K3,S K1 K2 
K2,K3,S K1 K3 
K1,K3,S K2 K1 
K1,K3,S K2 K3 
K1,K2,S K3 K1 
K1,K2,S K3 K2 
K1,S K2,K3 K1 
K2,S K1,K3 K2 
K3,S K1,K2 K3 
S K1,K2,K3 S 
  
 28 
III.3. ACTIVE SUPERVISOR 
 
Active supervisor would intervene once any of the controllers fail. Once a 
controller fails, active supervisor would takeover its control actions from data 
processing and forwarding the decisions to actuator. In this topology, the supervisor is 
the only node that needs to be fully aware of the data on the system. Controllers are 
not expected to takeover each other functions at any point in time, hence it does not 
need to be updated with each other status, and therefore less watchdog packets are 
exchanged. Only the supervisor would need to have full status of all controllers and 
all the sensor data for all cells on the conveyer belt. Therefore, the rendezvous point 
(AP) will only need to duplicate the data as shown in Figure 13. Also, watchdog 
packets will be exchanged between the supervisor from one side, and all the 
controllers from the other as shown in Figure 15. Another watchdog packets sent from 
controller to sensors and actuators on a much longer interval. This watchdog packet 
notifies the sensors and actuators that a certain controller failed and hence they would 
stop addressing it. Therefore, the access point would just forward the data from the 
sensor to the supervisor with no need to duplicate as shown in Figure 14.All possible 
states of an active supervisor mode are shown in Table 3. 
 
Figure 13: Sensor-Actuator Data Flow in Active Supervisor Fault-free 
 
- - - Sensor to K1 
- - -Sensor to S 
- - -S to Actuator 
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Figure 14: Sensor-Actuator Data Flow Active Supervisor K1 Fail 
 
 
Figure 15: Watchdog Data Flow for Active Supervisor Fault-free 
 
 
Watchdog between: 
__S and Ks 
 
- - - Sensor to AP 
- - -Sensor to S 
- - -S to Actuator 
 
 30 
Table 3: Possible states of active supervisor 
Working Failed Taking over  
K1,K2,K3,S _ _ 
K2,K3,S K1 S 
K1,K3,S K2 S 
K1,K2,S K3 S 
K1,S K2,K3 S 
K2,S K1,K3 S 
K3,S K1,K2 S  
S K1,K2,K3 S 
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III.4. INTERFERENCE 
In spite of the different system loads in active and passive supervisor, the wireless 
link on both modes will always be the same. This is due to multicasting. Multicasting 
allows each sensor to send only a single stream of packets over the air link. Then the 
multicasting rendezvous point (AP) would duplicate the stream as necessary. Also, 
this implies that the air link delay for all the possible states of the system (irrespective 
of the number of faulty /active controllers) will be nearly the same. 
Concluding from the above, there would be no need to model interference on all the 
possible scenarios. Only a single scenario would be sufficient to model the 
interference. 
Based on the study in section II.4, there are three main types of interference, 
Network congestion, medium congestion and jammers. It was found that jammers are 
the most threatening for the system.   
To model interference, a single band jammer would be interfering every 500ms 
over the full Wi-Fi spectrum. The jammer blocks the 2.4 GHz band. In order to 
examine the jammer thoroughly, the jammer would go around the perimeter of the 
three workcells. This will determine the system’s susceptibility to interference and 
quantify the interference level that can be tolerated without violating the time 
constraint or dropping data. 
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III.5. DELAY CALCULATIONS 
In order to calculate the expected delay of the system, three steps are taken: 
• Assessing the fairness and control effect on the delay 
• Calculating the wireless delay 
• Calculating the Ethernet delay 
III.5.1. FAIRNESS CALCULATIONS 
Based on [64], if two users are accessing the same AP, and are sharing the same 
wireless channel conditions, they will have equal chances of transmitting a packet at 
in a given slot time. This is explained by equation 1. 
 Equation (1) represents the access of the nodes to the medium. Given a network 
with N users, is the user number, 𝐹! 𝑚 , the fairness of the network during a timeslot 
m, is measured through (1).  
𝐹! 𝑚 = ( 𝛾!)!!!! !𝑁 𝛾!!!!!!  (1) 
 𝑖:  The user number 𝛾! :  The fraction of transmissions performed by UE i during a time slot m, 
m:  Time slot on the network 
N:  Number of users on the network 𝐹! 𝑚 :   The Jain fairness index of the network during a timeslot m 
 
When 𝐹! 𝑚  equals 1, the network is considered a network with equal chances 
for all users to access at any time slot. 
Applying the equation to the proposed model in section III, all 30 sensors and 
30 actuators in the same cell have same channel conditions and access same channel. 
All field devices are trying to access the same AP.  Assuming the similarity in channel 
conditions for all sensors in one workcell, then ( γ!!!!! )! = N γ!!!!!! . Therefore, all 
the users will have the same probability of sending data [6]. This will help in 
calculating the wireless delay on the payload. 
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III.5.2. DISTRIBUTED COORDINATION FUNCTION 
The main medium access protocol in IEEE 802.11 is Distributed Coordination 
function (DCF) [20]. DCF allows for automatic medium sharing between compatible 
PHYs [20].  The sharing is done through the use of Carrier Sense mechanisms [20].   
There are two types of Carrier sense techniques that should be done: physical and 
virtual mechanisms [20]. The physical mechanism is the Carrier Sense Multiple 
Access with Collision Avoidance CSMA/CA and a random back off time, in case the 
medium was in a busy condition [20]. 
CSMA/CA targets the reduction of the collision probability between multiple 
Stations accessing a medium at the time when most collisions are expected to occur. 
The time when a medium is sensed to be idle after it was busy (as indicated by Carrier 
Sensing function) is the most probable time of collisions [20].  All stations that were 
waiting to send their data would start sending [20]. Hence, collisions are most 
probable at that time [20].  In order to avoid such collisions, Back off procedure is 
used to resolve the contention conflicts [20]. 
For a station to transmit data, it senses the medium to check if another STA is 
transmitting [20].  In case the medium was not determined as busy, the transmission 
would proceed normally [20].  The CSMA/CA necessitates that there should be a 
minimum gap of idle duration between consecutive frame sequences [20]. The idle 
time between consecutive frames is DCF Inter-frame Space (DIFS) [20].  A 
transmitting station should insure that the medium is idle for the full-required duration 
before it starts sending [20]. 
In case the station determined that the medium is busy, it shall wait till the end of 
the current transition [20].  After the transmission is ended and the medium is sensed 
to be idle, the STA needs to select a random back-off time then send. The STA starts 
to decrement the back-off interval counter while the medium is idle. The receiver then 
waits for a short time interval between frame spaces (Short Interframe Space - SIFS) 
and sends an acknowledgement that it received the packet [66]. 
A transmission is considered successful in 2 cases:  
• The sending STA receives an ACK from the addressed STA 
• When a frame with a group address is transmitted completely 
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Virtual Carrier Sensing mechanisms are used to refine the physical carrier sensing 
mechanisms. The virtual mechanisms may be used under different circumstances to 
further minimize colliding incidences. The method depends on the Network 
Allocation Vector (NAV) that stores the location of nodes and expected sending time. 
This is achieved by distributing reservation information in order to announce the 
intention to use the medium.  The distribution could be done. One way to achieve 
such a reservation is through the exchange of Request To Send (RTS) and Clear To 
Send (CTS) frames. The CTS and RTS frames have a duration field the states the 
period of time that is needed to be reserved in order to complete the transmission of 
the actual frame and the ACK frame. A STA receiving either CTS (from the 
destination STA) or RTS (from the source station) will reserve the medium for the 
duration indicated  
RTS/CTS exchange acts as a type of fast collision interference and a transmission 
path check. Given the RTS frame is shorter than the data, it would be faster to detect 
the loss of an RTS (through a missed CTS) rather than the loss of a data frame 
(through ACK). This allows for faster collision detection, thus faster retransmission 
and medium access.  
One of the main problems resolved by the 4-way handshake system, RTS/CTS is 
the hidden node problem. 
RTS/CTS mechanism is also beneficial in case where multiple BSSs using the 
same channel overlap. The medium reservation mechanism would be effective across 
the BSS boundaries. The RTS/CTS mechanism could also improve operation in a 
situation where all STAs are able to communicate with the AP, but might not be able 
to receive from all other STAs. This is called Hidden node problem. 
In spite of it benefits and advantages, RTS/CTS mechanism, unlike CSMA/CA, is 
not used for every data frame transmission. The main drawback of the system is the 
additional overhead caused by the RTS and CTS frames. The additional overhead 
causes the system to be inefficient especially for short data frames. 
CTS-To-self was built to avoid such an overhead, where the sender sends a CTS-
to-self, which would be heard by all nodes. Then nodes will not transmit in the 
transmission period. This would prevent collisions in the case of the absence of 
hidden nodes to the sender. Given the importance of deadlines, and having an error-
communication, one of the virtual protection mechanisms would be used.  
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The main f of CTS/RTS over CTS-to-self is that CTS/RTS deals with the hidden 
node problem. If a node was not able to hear the RTS by the sender, should be able to 
hear the CTS from the receiver and hence stop sending [69]. 
According to [70], the system under study should not suffer from hidden node 
problem. Hence it would be sufficient to use CTS-to-Self protection scheme rather 
than CTS/RTS. 
In the system studied, wireless LAN at 3×3 m is modeled using a free space 
channel model. Equation (2) from [70] shows the condition for the number of to be 
zero  
 𝑛! 𝑟 = 0    𝑖𝑓  𝐸 𝑟 ≽ 𝐼 𝑟 + 𝑟         (2) 
 
I(r) represent the distant in which nodes would be interfering with the 
communication between two nodes. E is the range in which any communication 
provided by node can be detected. E and I (r) are calculated as in [70]: 
   I r = r TR!"!         (3) 
E   = P!"(A)α.TR!"!   (4) α =    (4π)!𝜆!𝐺!𝐺!  (5) 𝜆 = 𝑐/𝑓  (6) 
 
Where: 
• Ptx(A):  Transmission power of node A 
• α :   Channel gain 
• TRCP:  Capture Ratio 
• TRCS :  Carrier Sense Threshold 
• r :  Distance between the sending and receiving nodes. 
• Gt, Gr : Transmission and reception gains 0db 
• λ :  Wavelength 
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• c:  Speed of light 
• f:  Operating frequency 
• β :  Path loss exponent  
In the model studied, Ptx(A) is 0 dbm, TRCS  is −95dbm, capture ratio TRcp is 10 db 
[68,70]. β is 2 for free space channel model. α is calculated for a free space channel 
model as shown in equations (5-6).  
The distance r is the distance between the sensor/actuator and the AP. The 
maximum possible r would be the distance between a node on the edge of the 
workcell and the AP. Given the AP is placed in the middle of the cell, the workcell is 
a 3m×3m square, the distance between the furthest node and the AP would be half of 
the diagonal of a 3m×3m square. To calculate the distance r, Pythagoras rules are 
used. The resulted r would be 2.12m. 
 Using those numbers it is shown that E>I(r)+r. Hence, no hidden node problem is 
observed in the model. Given that the system is time sensitive, and that there is no 
hidden node problem, CTS-to-Self is used.  
 
  Table 4: Variables for Hidden node 
Variable Value 
Ptx(A) 1 mw 
TRCP 10 db 
TRCS -95 dbm 
r 2.21 m 
Gt, Gr 0 dbm 
c 3×108 m/s 
f 2.4 GHz 
β 2 
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III.5.3. WIRELESS DELAY 
 
In this section the wireless delay for the system under study is calculated as in [71] 
 
Where:  
• Twireless: Wireless delay 
• Theaders : Time taken by the headers of the medium access control 
(MAC) layer and physical layer (PHY). 
• TCTS: Time for a Clear-to-Send control message 
• TSIFS :  Time for a Short Inter-frame Space 
• TDIFS: Time for Distributed Coordination Function Inter-frame 
Space message  
• TACK : Time needed for the acknowledgement message 
• TD :  Data propagation delay 
• TBOFF : Time taken by the back off algorithm 
 
Tcts and Tsifs are added to the equation proposed in [71] for wireless delay to 
account for the use of the CTS-to-self mechanism.  
To calculate the delay the payload of 10B, sampling period of 40ms, and channel 
bandwidth of 54Mbps. The number of nodes is 60 (30 sensors and 30 actuators 
accessing the same AP). These values provide the delay of data over the wireless 
LAN as in (8).  
T! = 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  ×  Number  of  Nodes    𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒  (8) 
TDIFS and TSIFS periods are 28µs and 10µs respectively  [20]. MAC, PHY headers 
ACK and CTS sizes are transferred at the lowest data rate possible of 1Mbps [20]. 
Based on that, MAC and PHY header delays are 288µs, 112µs, respectively [20]. TCTS 
is 112µs and TACK is 240µs [20]. 
𝑇!"#$%$&& = 𝑇!"#+2×𝑇!"#! +   𝑇!!"#!$% + 𝑇! + 𝑇!"# + 𝑇!"#$ + 𝑇!"## (7) 
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In order to calculate the back-off delay, the needed parameters are CWmin and slot 
time [71, 20]. CWmin is 15 slots. The slot time is 9µs [20]. 𝑇!"## = 0.5 ∗ 𝐶𝑊!"#×𝑇!"#$ (9) 
 
Where: 
• CWmin : Minimum Contention window 
• Tslot :  slot time 
Plugging all the data into (7), the wireless delay per air link is 3.11ms. 
 
Table 5: Variables for wireless delay calculations 
Variable Value 
Packet Size 10 bytes 
Number of Nodes 60 
Sampling period 40 ms 
Bandwidth 54 Mbps 
TDIFS 28µs 
TSIFS 10µs 
MAC header delay 288µs 
PHY header delay 112µs 
TCTS 112µs 
TACK 240µs 
CWmin 15 slots 
Slot time 9µs 
  
 39 
 
III.5.4. SWITCHED ETHERNET DELAY 
There are four components of the Ethernet delay: store, switch fabric, wire line and 
queuing latency [25]. Those delays are represented through equations (10) to (13). In 
order to calculate the queuing delay and the wire line delay, the network load is 
calculated. The Network Load (NL) reflects the amount of data transmitted over the 
network. This is calculated as shown in (10) [25].  
The Network Load is represented by equation (10): 
NL = !"#$!! !"#$!"×! × !"#$%&'()  !"#$%"&&'%( !!"#$   !!"##  !"#$%&'  !"#"$%&'   (10) 
 
Where: 
loads: Sensor data 
loadwd   Watchdog load  𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑!: Data sent to the actuators  
 
The Forward Store (FS) delay (𝑇!") is the size of the packets (𝑠) multiplied by the 
number of packets (𝑛) divided by the rate (𝑟) of 1Gbps [25]. 𝑇!" = 𝑠×𝑛𝑟  (11) 
 
The latency that results from the switch silicon and switch properties is Switch 
Fabric (𝑇!") [25] 
𝑇!" = 1𝑃𝑟 (12) 𝑇!"  is the delay required by the switch to service a packet. In the proposed model, 
the Packet Service Rate (𝑃𝑟) is 500K packets/s). 
The Queuing latency (𝑇!) represents the percentage of the network load from the 
full capacity of the network multiplied by the largest possible 𝑇!". The latency is 
calculated as follows [25]:  
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The Wire Line (WL) delay (𝑇!") represents the time taken by the data for 
transmission. It is calculated as the distance divided by the transmission rate of the 
line and this can be ignored for indoors distances as mentioned in [25]. 
The addition of the four types of delays are calculated per Ethernet link, and added 
together to give the Ethernet delay. 
 𝑇!"!!"#!$(𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ) = 𝑇!" + 𝑇!" + 𝑇! + 𝑇!"    (14) 
 𝑇!"#!!"!!"# = (𝑇!"#$%$&& + 𝑇!"!!"#!$)×2 (15) 
The total end-to-end delay would be the wireless delay and the Ethernet delay from 
the sensor to controller and from controller to actuator. Hence it would be double the 
addition of the wireless and Ethernet delay. 
III.5.4.1. CALCULATION RESULTS  
The calculations are held for the active and passive supervisor modes in both 
states: fault-free and with faulty controllers. 
The passive supervisor scenario in the fault-free state showed an end-to-end delay 
of 8.92ms. The delay decreases to 8.17ms once a controller fails.  
The decrease in delay is caused by the fact that when a controller fails, less data is 
communicated over the wired Ethernet network. The need to send any data to the 
failed controller is eliminated. Thus, the APs will only triple the sensor data, rather 
than quadrupling. 
When a second controller fails, the system will experience a slight increase in 
delay to 8.49ms compared to one controller failure. The increase is due to the 
direction of all the data loads to the third controller. Therefore, The third controller 
claims the responsibility of its own load beside the loads of the other two controllers. 
The loads cause some additional delay at the taking over controller. The additional 
delay surpass the decrease in delay due to decreasing the data load on the whole 
network, causing an overall slight increase in delay over the scenario with one 
𝑇! = 𝑁𝐿×𝑇!" (13) 
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controller failing. However, due to the decreased network load, the delay is still less 
than the delay in the fault-free case. 
The active supervisor mode has a delay of 7.85ms in the fault-free state. The delay 
is reduced when one controller fails to reach 7.77ms. The slight decrease is due to the 
reduction in data transmitted (no duplication). Unlike the case in the passive 
supervisor, no increase occurred because the supervisor had no original load. When 
two controllers fail, the delay will increase to be 8.38ms. The decrease in data was not 
large enough to cover for the increase in delay due to the load on the supervisor. 
The state when the three controllers fail and the supervisor takes over is common 
between the passive and the active supervisor modes. When the supervisor takes over 
all the control functions in the network, a delay of 8.81ms is encountered. In this case, 
the APs send only one single stream to the supervisor in the absence of watchdog 
packets are going through the network. The delay in the all fail scenario reflects the 
need of one controller (in this case the supervisor) to manage all the data on the 
network.  
The active mode scenarios always give lower delay than the passive scenario; 
except in the state when all three controllers fail as both modes equate. The reason of 
the discrepancy is the fewer amounts of data loads required in the active supervisor 
scenarios.  
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III.6. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The model proposed in Section III is simulated using OPNET Modeler [63]. The 
system is replicated in two modes: passive supervisor mode and active supervisor 
mode. The ability of the system to endure interference noise is tested. The model 
benchmarks are to have zero packet drops and a maximum end-to-end delay of 36ms. 
Theoretical and simulation end-to-end delays for different scenarios are calculated 
and shown in Table 8. All simulation results are based on a 95% confidence analysis. 
The model air fairness on the air link explained is section III.5.1, was checked 
through checking the wireless delay as shown in Figure 16: Wireless Delay for All 
Sensors and Actuators in One Cell. The delay oscillates between 3 to 4 ms, which is 
close from the 3.11ms calculated. 
 
Figure 16: Wireless Delay for All Sensors and Actuators in One Cell 
 
III.6.1. PASSIVE SUPERVISOR 
The passive supervisor could have one of eleven states mentioned in Table 6. It 
starts operating with all controllers operating which is the fault-free scenario. Then 
one controller could fail.  
The failing controller could be K1, K2 or K3. In case K1 failed, K2 or K3 are 
expected to takeover. In case K2 failed, K1 or K3 may takeover, while if K3 Fails, K2 
or K1 would takeover.   
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Figure 9 shows the symmetry in the network. The distance between the AP and K1 
would be equivalent to distance between AP and K3. The distance between K1 and S 
is the same as the distance between K3 and S. Hence; there are some scenarios that 
would be equivalent to each other as their network load is the same and distance 
between nodes are the same. The redundant scenarios are shown in Table 6. 
Scenario A is the fault free scenario when all controllers and supervisor are 
working. Scenario B represents the failure of one controller and the controller that 
takes over is the controller on the adjacent cell. These cases could be when K1 fails 
and K2 takes over, K2 fails and K3 takes over or K3 fails and K2 Takes over. 
Scenario C represents the failure of one controller and the controller on the furthest 
cell takes over. Scenario C is true in cases when K1 fails and K3 Takes over and when 
K3 fails and K1 takes over. 
Scenario D represents the cases when the two controllers, which failed, are 
adjacent to each other. This means that one cell will be taken over by the closest 
controller and another will be taken over by the nearest controller. This is satisfied for 
scenarios when controller 1 and controller 2 fails and K3 takeover, or when K3 and 
K2 fail and K1 takeover. 
Scenario E represents the failure of two controllers far from each other, with the 
taking over controller in between. This would be represented by the failure of K1 and 
K3 where K2 takes over. 
Scenario F represents the failure of all controllers and the supervisor would 
takeover all control functions in the workcell. 
The scenarios could be categorized as fault-free scenarios and scenarios where a 
fault occurs on one or more controller. The fault-free scenario was simulated as 
scenario A. The end-to-end delay was found to be between 4.29 and 8.73ms. The end-
to-end delay was similar to the delay from the theoretical equation. The difference 
between the maximum of the confidence interval and the theoretical result was around 
4.35%. 
The data flow in the passive supervisor mode is explained in Section III. When all 
controllers are working, the highest delay occurs. This happens because all APs are 
quadrupling the sensor data streams to reach the three controllers and the supervisor. 
Also, there is a watchdog packet transmitted between all controllers and each other 
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and between the controller and the supervisor. The high amount of data exchanged on 
the system would cause the delay to be highest. 
The second set of scenarios represents cases where one or more controllers fail. 
These are represented by scenarios B,C,D,E and F.  
 As a model of scenario B, the scenario where K1 fails and K2 takes over cell one 
control functions is simulated. The delay in this scenario is expected to be within a 
range between 3.57 and 7.26ms. This means the delay is less than delay in scenario A 
by around 22.1%  
Scenario C is modeled through the simulation of the failure of K1 fails and K3 
takes over. This shows a decrease from fault free scenario by 26%. The decrease 
happens due to the decrease in the load transmitted over the network. The difference 
between K2 taking over and K3 taking over is not significant. 
Scenario D is represented by the failure of K1 and K2 and K3 taking over the 
controller functions of cells 1 and 2. In this case the delay is between 4.03 and 
8.22ms. The delay is 13.7% more when compared to scenarios where one controller 
only failed. However, the delay is still below the fault-free scenario by 11.9%. 
Scenario E is simulated by K2 taking over the control functions of K1 and K3. The 
delay simulated was between 4.22 and 8.60ms. The delay increases by 15.6% 
compared to taking over one controller. The delay is below scenario A by 7.8%. The 
increase could be explained by the trade-off between the decrease in network load and 
having one controller takeover all the control work. When two controllers fail, there is 
a decrease in delay due to the decrease in network load. However, a single controller 
is doing the control functions of the two cells, which would mean that there would be 
higher load at the controller taking over. It is shown that the control load increase in 
delay was higher than the decrease of network load. Hence, there is an overall 
increase in the delay when compared to one controller failing.  
Scenario F is when the third controller fails, and the supervisor takes over all 
control functions. A very slight increase of 1.5%, in comparison to scenarios when 
two controller fail, occurs. The delay is between 4.29 and 8.73ms. The delay is still 
below the fault-free scenario by 6.41%.  
From this, it can be concluded that the effect of the data load on the delay is higher 
than the effect of having one controller taking over the whole setup. This is because 
although all data load is relieved from the network, when the supervisor alone takes 
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over the whole control network, the delay is less than that when all controllers are 
operating.  
 
Table 6: Passive Supervisor redundant scenarios 
 
 
Table 7: Active Supervisor redundant scenarios 
Redundancy Working Failed Taking over  
G K1,K2,K3,S _ _ 
H K2,K3,S K1 S 
I K1,K3,S K2 S 
H K1,K2,S K3 S 
J K1,S K2,K3 S 
K K2,S K1,K3 S 
J K3,S K1,K2 S  
F S K1,K2,K3 S 
 
  
Redundancy Working Failed Taking over 
A K1,K2,K3,S _ _ 
B K2,K3,S K1 K2 
C K2,K3,S K1 K3 
B K1,K3,S K2 K1 
B K1,K3,S K2 K3 
C K1,K2,S K3 K1 
B K1,K2,S K3 K2 
D K1,S K2,K3 K1 
E K2,S K1,K3 K2 
D K3,S K1,K2 K3 
F S K1,K2,K3 S 
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Table 8: Numerical analysis vs. Simulation results 
Scenario Delay (ms) Theoretical (ms) 
 
All Fail S TO [4.29;8.73] 8.81 
Pa
ss
iv
e 
Fault-Free [4.58; 9.33] 8.92 
K1 fail K2 TO [3.57; 7.26] 8.17 
K1 fail K3 TO [3.48;7.09] 8.17 
K1 & K2 fail K3 TO [4.03:8.22] 8.49 
K1 & K3 fail K2 TO [4.22;8.60] 8.49 
A
ct
iv
e 
Fault-Free [3.38; 6.88] 7.85 
K1 fail S TO [3.30; 6.73] 7.77 
K2 fail S TO [3.38;6.88] 7.77 
K1 & K2 fail S TO [3.67;7.48] 8.38 
K1 & K3 fail S TO [3.72;7.58] 8.38 
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III.6.2. ACTIVE SUPERVISOR 
The Active supervisor mode would operate either in fault-free mode or with one or 
more faulty controllers. The active supervisor mode would always be in one of the 
eight states mentioned in Table 3. At the beginning, all controllers operate normally, 
which is the fault-free scenario. Then one or more controllers could fail. In all the 
possible failure states, the supervisor would takeover.  
The active supervisor system architecture and data flow was explained in Section 
III.3. The sensors would send a stream of packets to the AP. The AP would duplicate 
the data stream. The AP sends one stream to the controller of the work-cell, and 
another to the supervisor. In case a controller fails, the supervisor takes over and the 
AP does not duplicate data anymore.  Watchdog packets are exchanged between 
controllers and the supervisor but not between controllers. As in the passive 
supervisor system, it can be fault-free or it may have one or more faulty controllers. 
As explained in section III.6.1, there are some scenarios that are redundant due to 
the similar network load and the symmetrical topology. The redundant active 
scenarios are shown in Table 7. In order to distinguish between active and passive 
scenario, numbering is continued from passive scenarios.  
The fault-free scenario in the active supervisor is simulated as scenario G. The 
main difference between scenario A and scenario G is the load on the network. In the 
fault-free scenario, the maximum simulation delay is 6.88ms. 
Scenario H is when one of the furthest controllers (either K1 or K3) to the 
supervisor fail. Scenario I is when K2 fails. Scenario J is when two adjacent 
controllers fail while scenario K is when two controllers far from each other fail.  
The failure of the first controller was simulated using scenarios H where K1 fails 
and scenario I when K2 fails. Supervisor takes over in all cases. As shown in Table 8, 
scenarios H, G and I have very similar delay intervals. The failure of the first 
controller (scenarios H,I) did not highly affect the delay, because the load per 
controller is the same and the data load decrease is very slight. 
Scenario J is simulated as K1 and K2 failure. Scenario K is simulated as the failure 
of K1 and K3. The difference between both scenarios is shown to be slight. When two 
controllers fail, the delay increases in comparison to the fault-free by 8% to 9%. The 
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increase in delay due to the supervisor taking over two controllers was higher than the 
decrease in delay due to the decrease in data load.  
Scenario F represents the failure of all controllers and the supervisor taking over. 
This case is the same in both active and passive supervisor mode. When three 
controllers fail, the delay increases by 13% to 14% compared to the failure of two 
controllers. The failure of the three controllers shows the effect of having one 
controller taking over all three cells at the lowest data loads. 
The difference between the theoretical and the simulation results is due to different 
factors like the assumptions of full fairness explained in Section III.E and taking 
worst-case scenarios while calculating the theoretical data. 
 
III.6.1. COMPARING PASSIVE AND ACTIVE SUPERVISORS 
The active supervisor configuration showed better delays than the passive 
supervisor in both theoretical and simulation results. In the fault-free case, the active 
supervisor system shows a delay improvement by around 26%. The main difference 
between the fault-free scenario in active and passive supervisor is the data load. The 
reduction of the amount of data exchanged in the active scenario, as mentioned, 
lowers the delay on the active supervisor network 
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III.7. INTERFERENCE 
One of the main disadvantages of wireless systems over wired system is being 
susceptible to interference. Hence, to insure a wireless system is fully functional the 
system has to prove to be resilient to interference. 
As mentioned in section II.2.1.1, the factory floor noise will not interfere with the 
communication on the Wi-Fi WNCS system. Hence, only interference in the ISM 
band would affect the system. In section II.4, all the possible types of interference on 
a Wi-Fi NCS system were explored. The three types were medium congestion, 
network congestion and jammers. The study in section II.4, proved jammers to be the 
most damaging type of interference, so it will be used to model interference. 
Due to multicasting, the loads on the air link on all scenarios A-J are the same. 
Therefore, the effect of interference on all scenarios will be the same. Hence, only the 
scenario with the worst delay will be considered for interference. As shown in Table 
8, it is the fault-free passive supervisor mode  
To model interference, a single band jammer with inter-arrival time of 0.5ms 
would be directed over the full Wi-Fi spectrum. For the sake of experimenting, 
quantifying and comparing the jammer in the experiment is considered as ideal that 
would send a certain file size at a constant interval. The jammer blocks the 2.4 GHz 
band. The jammer would go around the perimeter of the three workcells. The path of 
the jammer simulated is shown in Figure 18. The jammer is set to send a certain file 
size, then experiment repeated with a smaller file size till the maximum size that does 
fulfills the delay benchmark of 36ms and causes no drops is found. The simulation 
will determine the system’s susceptibility to interference and quantify the interference 
level that can be tolerated without violating the time constraint or dropping data.  
Figure 17 show that delays increase when the jammer starts working and, after the 
jammer is off, delays recovers back to their original values. The x-axis represents the 
Simulation Time while the y-axis represents the observed Delay. 
Simulations showed that the maximum size of allowable jammer interference is 
8KB. This size will keep the end-to-end delays below the 36ms constraint without any 
packet loss.  
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Figure 17: Effect of Jammer on Simulation [65] 
 
 
Figure 18: OPNET Simulation for Interference 
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IV. PERFORMABILITY 
The difference between the measured delay and the benchmarking delay is 
considered to be an indicator of the system robustness as shown in [22]. As the 
difference gets bigger, it is less likely that the system would go beyond the 
permissible delay level. 
Transient performability was used in [59,22] to measure the robustness of the 
system. First, a reliability model was built using the Continuous Time Markov Chain 
(CTMC). Second, a reward was assigned to each state. The reward was calculated as 
the difference between the average end-to-end delay in that state and the maximum 
allowable delay. The rationale behind the choice of this reward system is that the 
difference between the system deadline and the maximum observed end-to-end delay 
indicates the robustness of the system. 
 The performability of the system studied in this paper would follow the same 
technique followed in [59].  
IV.1. MARKOV MODEL 
The Markov model of the system is shown in Figure 19. The model represents the 
operation of the hierarchical fault-tolerant architecture described in this research. For 
the purpose of this study, the supervisor is assumed to be the most reliable node on 
the network and hence is expected to fail last. Based on this assumption, the Markov 
model has five states. The explanation of each of the five states as well as the 
transition of each state is described below. 
First state for the system is {3K+S}. The system starts in a fault-free state when all 
the three controllers are fully operation; each is taking over its own tasks. The 
supervisor in this state is just watching over for the controllers but not taking any 
control loads itself. 
It is assumed that three controllers are identical, hence all have same failure rate λk 
and that the Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) is exponentially distributed [57]. Based on 
the assumption the rate of the transition from state  {3K+S} to state {2K+S} is 3λk. It 
will be the rate of failure of any of the three controllers. Note that the Mean Time to 
Failure (MTTF) is equal to (1/λk).  
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 Due to the assumption that the three controllers are identical, they are 
considered to have the same repair rate of µk. It is needed to repair one controller in 
order to move back to state {3K+S} with a rate of µk. The repair time is assumed to 
have an exponential distribution and the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) is equal to 
(1/µk). 
 
Figure 19: Markov Model [74] 
In case a controller failed before the first controller was repaired the system moves 
from State {2K+S} to State {1K+S}. The transition rate in this case is 2λk since any 
of the two remaining controllers might fail.  
The transition back from State {1K+S} to State {2K+S} happens if any of the two 
faulty controllers were repaired. This would need a transition equal to 2µk. It is 
assumed that there are 2 repair persons are available [57]. 
With a single operational controller, the system moves to state {0k+S} at a rate of 
λk. In this state, the supervisor carry out all of the control function on the production 
line as none of the controllers is functional. In case any of the three failed controllers 
is repaired before the failure of the supervisor, the system moves back to State 
{1K+S} at a rate of 3µk (assuming three repair persons).  
In case the supervisor fails before any of the three controllers is repaired, the entire 
system fails and goes to State {F}. Given that the supervisor was assumed to fail last, 
its reliability is assumed to be relatively higher than the controllers. The failure rate of 
the supervisor is λs. The transition rate between States {0K+S} and {F} is λs. Residing 
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in the {F} state means that the entire production line has failed. An assumption is 
made that the management will wait until all faults are repaired to take the system 
back to its fully operational State {3K+S}. The rate of this transition is µsys. 
To simplify the following explanation, states {3K+S}, {2K+S}, {1K+S}, {S} and 
{F} will be represented as states 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0. Let P!(t) be the probability of 
residing in state i (i = 4, 3, 2, 1, 0) at time t. Let T be the Transition Rate Matrix. The 
transient probability of residing in any of the five states can be calculated using the 
following Chapman-Kolmogorov equations as follows [57]: dPdt = P×T (16) 
 P = P!  P!  P!P!  P!  (17) 
 
T = −3λ! 3λ! 0 0 0µμ! −2λ! − µμ! 2λ! 0 00 2µμ! −2µμ! − λ! λ! 00 0 3µμ! −3µμ! − λ!"! λ!"!µμ!"! 0 0 0 −µμ!"!  (18) 
 dP!dt = −3λ!.P! + P!. µμ! + P!. µμ!"! (19) 
 dP!dt = 3λ!.P! + P!. (−2λ! − µμ!)+ P!. 2λ! (20) 
 dP!dt = 2λ!.P! + P!. (−2µμ! − λ!)+ P!. 3µμ! (21) 
 dP!dt = λ!.P! + P!. (−3µμ! − λ!"!) (22) 
 dP!dt = λ!"!.P! − P!. µμ!"! (23) 
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The initial conditions at t= 0 are assumed that the system is fully functional; hence 
it is assumed that the system is in state 4. Therefore, P!(0) = 1 and P! 0 = P! 0 = P! 0 = P! 0 = 0. The Chapman-Kolmogorov equations can be solved to 
obtain Pi(t) for i = 4, 3, 2, 1, 0. 
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IV.2.  REWARD AND PERFORMABILITY 
One of the important metrics to assess the robustness of a fault-tolerant system is 
performability. Performability takes into account component failures and the 
performance, simultaneously. 
Performability study starts with a Markov model as a first step. The second step, 
each state is assigned a reward or a penalty. The same strategy applied in [22, 59] is 
used. The reward will be equal to the difference between the system end-to-end delay 
in any state and the benchmark deadline. The benchmark deadline for the system is 
36ms. The larger the difference is, the better the robustness and performance of the 
system. The delays were measured with OPNET simulation with a 95% confidence 
analysis. Table 9 shows the upper bounds of the confidence interval for the end-to-end 
delays of the system in the passive mode. Table 10, shows the same values for the 
active mode. As the delay approaches the 36ms benchmark, the packets experiences a 
higher risk of missing the allowable deadline.  
 
Table 9: Reward per state for passive supervisor 
State Highest End-to-End 
Delays (ms) 
Reward 
(ms) 
{3K+S} 9.33 26.67 
{2K+S} 7.26 28.74 
{1K+S} 8.6 27.4 
{0K+S} 8.73 27.27 
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Table 10: Reward per state in Active supervisor 
State Highest End-to-End 
Delays (ms) 
Reward (ms) 
{3K+S} 6.88 29.12 
{2K+S} 6.88 29.12 
{1K+S} 7.58 28.42 
{0K+S} 8.73 27.27 
 
As mentioned in section III.6.1 and section III.6.2, there are some identical 
scenarios under each state and some different scenarios. The highest delay among the 
all the possibility will be used to calculate the reward for each State to obtain the 
worst-case performability.  
The Transient Performability TP(t) is calculated as follows [59]: 
 
TP t = P!(t)×R!!!!!  (24) 
 
where Ri is the reward associated with State i.  
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IV.2.1. CASE STUDY 
Based on the methodology outlined in Section IV.2, a case study was carried out to 
compare between the performability of the active and passive supervisor modes for 
the hierarchical WNCS. The tool used to carry out the analysis is SHARPE [73]. It 
was used to carry out the performability analysis based on the Markov model and the 
values for the reward per state for each of the passive and active modes as in Table 9 
and 10 respectively The failure rates λk and λs used were 1months-1 and 0.25months-1, 
respectively. The difference between the two values is due to the assumption that the 
supervisor is more robust than the controllers. Moreover, the repair rates µk and µsys 
were used as 2months-1 and 1months-1 respectively. The explanation to the difference 
is the assumption that if the supervisor fails, the management will wait till the full 
system is repaired. It is expected that the repair time µsys will be larger as the repair 
time of the entire system would be greater than the repair time of a single controller.  
Figure 20 illustrates the resulting performability curves over time for both the active 
and passive supervisor modes. 
 
Figure 20: Performability vs. Time (Active vs. Passive) 
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IV.2.1.1.  PASSIVE SUPERVISOR 
Equation (24) shows the Transient Probability (TP) calculation. TP is calculated as 
the summation of the result of multiplying the probability of residing in a state by the 
reward of the state. The reward (r) of being at any state is the difference between the 
benchmark delay and the delay simulated. The delay used is the maximum end-to-end 
delay between the sensors and actuators using a 95% confidence analysis. 
The end-end delay is 9.33ms in the first state {3K+S}, when all controllers are 
functional. When one controller fails, the second state {2K+S} has six available 
alternatives. The failing K could be K1, K2 or K3. One of the two functional 
controllers would takeover, so each K has two possible scenarios of takeover. Due to 
symmetry, failures of the first and third controller have same delays. 
As shown in Table 7, the failure of one controller and being taken over by its 
neighbor is equivalent to the opposite case, when the neighbor fails and be taken over 
by the controller. Hence, there are two distinctive options for state {2K+S}; either 
controller 1 failing and controller 2 taking over or controller 1 failing and controller 3 
taking over. The higher of the two delays was the delay of the state where controller 1 
failed which was 7.26ms. For the third state {K+S}, the available possible scenarios 
after eliminating symmetrical options would be either failure of controller 1 and 
controller 2 or failure of controller 1 and 3. The scenario with the higher delay was 
the failure of Controller 3 and controller 1. In the final state, when all controllers fail 
{S} only one value of the delay is available of 8.73ms. The highest possible delay of 
each state in passive supervisor scenario is shown in Table 1.  
Figure 20 shows the performability of the passive supervisor mode. The 
performability of the system is at its lowest at t = 0. In other words, the worst 
performance of the system occurs at fault-free state. The main reason for that is the 
amount of data transmitted from the all the sensors on the three workcells being 
quadrupled over the wired backbone. In addition, watchdog packets are exchanged 
between controllers and each other and between controllers and the supervisor. The 
reason for quadrupling and watchdog signals is that all the controllers and the 
supervisor be aware of the last state of the system in order to provide for the needed 
takeover at any point of failure. Based on that, the delay of the overall packet end-to-
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end in the fault-free scenario is higher than the delays of scenarios with faulty 
controllers, which does not require the same amount of data.  
As such, the experienced overall packet end-to-end delays are higher than in the 
faulty scenarios, which do not require as much packet duplication. The observed 
performability of the passive supervisor mode stabilizes over time to around 27.53ms. 
IV.2.1.2. ACTIVE SUPERVISOR 
The delays for the active supervisor states are calculated the same way as delays in 
passive supervisor. Symmetrical cases are eliminated to leave the following states, All 
controller functional in {3K+S}, failure of controller 1 or controller 2 with the 
supervisor taking over to represent state {2K+S}, and failure of controllers 1 and 2 or 
1 and 3 to represent the {K+S} state and all controllers fail in state {S}. The highest 
delay of each state is chosen to represent the delay of the state and shown in Table 2. 
The same values for λ!,   λ!"!,   µμ!"!  and  µμ!   were used as in the passive supervisor 
performability analysis. The curve for TP(t) was drawn based on the active reward 
shown in Table 2. 
From Figure 3, it can be noticed that the performability of the active supervisor 
mode is at its highest at t = 0. Thus, the active mode offers the best performance 
during the fault-free state. As controllers start to fail, all traffic is rerouted to the 
supervisor node, which becomes responsible for the control of all failed cells. The 
added network delays result in an increase in overall packet end-to-end delay and 
consequently lower performance. The observed performability of the active 
supervisor mode stabilizes over time to around 28.65ms. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
There is a trend to replace wired control system by wireless networked control 
system in factory automation. The main reasons for that trend is the robustness and 
flexibility offered by the wireless option. A wireless workcell communication for 
factory automation was proposed in earlier literature. The workcell was composed of 
30 sensors, 30 actuators communicating wirelessly through 802.11 Technology to 
AP(s). The AP(s) is wired to the controller of the cell through switched Ethernet. 
The presented research studied the addition of a supervisor to a version of the Wi-
Fi WNCS cell.  The Wi-Fi WNCS cell represented a conveyer belt with 3 work-cells. 
Each workcell has 30 sensors, 30 actuators and communicated via 802.11g with a 
single AP. The AP is connected to a switch, which is connected to all the controllers 
of the three cells, in order to provide for a fault tolerance over the controller level. The 
AP is connected to the switch using switched Ethernet technology. 
In this thesis, multicasting was applied to the system to allow for better 
performance. Multicasting allowed each sensor to send one stream of packets to the 
access point instead of duplicates of streams. The AP would do the needed duplication 
and would forward through switched Ethernet to the designated controllers. 
There are two possible modes for the supervisor to handle the control: passive or 
active. If the supervisor is passive, the controller refrain from participating in the 
control scheme till all controllers fail. At that point, the controller would intervene 
and carry the control load of the whole system. The other mode is active supervisor. 
In active supervisor, once any controller fails, the supervisor would intervene to 
handle the control load. 
The system was simulated using OPNET software with 95% confidence analysis. 
Through mathematical delay calculations and OPNET simulations it was proved that 
active supervisor performance provided a better performance. 
The ability of the system to withhold external interference was assessed through 
adding a single band jammer to the OPNET simulation. The system was able to hold 
up to 8KB interfering file sent from a single band jammer affecting the full Wi-Fi 
spectrum. All results were subjected to a 95% confidence analysis 
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The performability of passive and active supervisor systems was compared. A 
Markov model of both systems was created. The model showed five states, state were 
all controllers and supervisor are functional, state were two out of three controllers 
and the supervisor are functional, one controller and supervisor functioning, only the 
supervisor functioning, then total system failure state. 
The supervisor was assumed to be the most robust node on the network hence the 
failure rate of the supervisor was considered much less that that of the controller. 
Moreover, it was assumed that if the supervisor fails the management would wait till 
the full system is back on air. Thus, the repair rate of the supervisor is expected to be 
much higher. 
The transient probabilities for each system were calculated. The probability of 
residing at each state was multiplied by the reward of residing at that state. The results 
of products of all states were summed up together to give the transient probability. 
The reward was considered as the difference between the benchmark of 36ms and the 
system delay. As the difference increases, the system is considered more robust, as the 
probability of a packet exceeding the benchmark decreases.  
In order to compare the performability of a hierarchical passive and active 
supervisor, a case study was carried out based on the methodology mentioned. It was 
shown that by time, the performability of a passive supervisor system is enhanced 
while that of an active supervisor system degraded. However, the active supervisor 
showed a better performability in all cases. 
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APPENDIX – CONFIDENCE ANALYSIS 
 
All results subjected to a confidence analysis follow the following calculations. 
Let: 
 
X:  random variable (maximum end-to-end delay). 
µ: Average of X 
σ2: Variance of X 
Xi: sample of X obtained during it OPNET simulation (using different seed) 
n: No. of OPNET simulations 
x: Sample mean 
s2: Sample variance 
 𝑥 = !! !!!!!!  (1) 
 𝑠! = 1𝑛 − 1 𝑋! − 𝑥 !!!!!  (2) 
 
OPNET Network Modeler requires a ‘seed’ value. The value is used to generate 
different random number generator equations. The equations help to simulate the 
behavior of non-deterministic aspects. If the distribution of a random variable is 
unknown, the distribution of its sample mean will approach a normal distribution, as 
the number of samples increases based on the Central Limit Theorem (CLT). The 
sample mean also approaches the ensemble mean and the variance of the sample 
mean is a scaled version of the ensemble mean (mean of x = µ = mean of X and 
variance of x=  =  where σ2 = variance of X [32, 49].  
Therefore, the confidence level is defined as the probability that x is below a 
certain distance from µ: 
 𝑧 = 𝑥 − 𝜇𝜎!  (3) 
2
xσ n
2σ
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z: is a normal random variable (mean= 0 & variance = 1). 
 𝑃 −𝑧! < 𝑧 < 𝑧! = 𝛼 (4) 
 𝑃 𝑥 − 𝜇𝜎! < 𝑧! = 𝛼 (5) 
 
By using 33 simulations, n > 30 and hence the sample standard deviation s can be 
used instead of σ as it is difficult to find . The Normal distribution will be used 
and zα is calculated for a confidence level α = 95%. 
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